A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys by Zacharias, Fred C.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1992
A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury
Subpoenas of Attorneys
Fred C. Zacharias
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zacharias, Fred C., "A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys" (1992). Minnesota Law Review. 1322.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1322
A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand
Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys
Fred C. Zacharias*
A significant recent amendment to the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Model Rules of Professional Conduct restricts the abil-
ity of prosecutors to subpoena lawyers.' The amendment reacts
to a bevy of proposals, spanning over a decade, that focus specif-
ically on grand jury subpoenas directed to attorneys.2 Six states
have adopted the new model rule in some form.3 At least two
* Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. B.A. 1974, Johns
Hopkins University;, J.D. 1977, Yale Law School; LL.M. 1981, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center. Several colleagues provided helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this article, including Professors Lawrence Alexander, Kevin Cole,
Miguel Mendez-Longoria, Mary Jo Newborn, Steven Walt, Donald Weckstein,
and Lawrence Winer. In addition to these colleagues, I thank my able re-
search assistants, Dennis Dollar and Laurie Martin, for their assistance.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f) (1983) (added
1991). See generally Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State,
70 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming June 1992) (discussing the controversy over
Model Rule 3.8(f) and arguing that the controversy reflects the bar's norma-
tive vision of how the law should apply to lawyers); Roger C. Cramton & Lisa
K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Prosecutors: The Controversies Over the
Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules 114-26 (Dec. 7, 1991) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Minnesota Law Review) (discussing the history and
normative validity of the enactment of Model Rule 3.8(f)). The ABA first sug-
gested reform in 1986 and 1988. See ABA, Resolution on Attorney Subpoenas
(Feb. 1988) [hereinafter 1988 ABA Resolution], reprinted in Max D. Stern &
David Hoffman, Privileged Iforners: The Attorney Su6poena Problem and a
Proposal for Reforn, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1853-54 (1988); ABA, Resolution
on Subpoenaing Attorneys Before the Grand Jury (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter 1986
ABA Resolution], reprinted in Stern & Hoffman, supra, at 1852. The 1988 Res-
olution strengthened the 1986 Resolution and expanded the rule's application
to all prosecutorial attempts to obtain lawyer testimony relating to representa-
tion of a client's affairs, before the grand jury or elsewhere. Model Rule 3.8(f)
tracks the 1988 proposal.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 14-31. Model Rule 3.8(f) applies to
all prosecution subpoenas directed to attorneys, not just those issuing from the
grand jury. The rule does not address attorney subpoenas in lawsuits between
private civil litigants, which present many of the same problems. Because con-
cern over grand jury subpoenas was the driving force for reform, this Article
confines itself to analyzing grand jury subpoenas. Nevertheless, much of the
analysis applies equally to the other contexts.
3. See MASS. Sup. CT. R. 3:08 (Prosecution Function 15) (1986); N.H.
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have rejected it. 4
This Article demonstrates that Model Rule 3.8(f) and the
related proposals to limit lawyers' grand jury testimony rely
upon the wrong remedy. Grand jury subpoenas of lawyers raise
a legitimate concern: lawyer testimony about client affairs may
undermine clients' trust. Reformers universally have advo-
cated judicial review of the issuance of these subpoenas, a pro-
cedural safeguard that does not protect clients' interests in
attorney loyalty once the reviewing court allows an investiga-
tion to proceed. At the same time, routine judicial review of
grand jury subpoenas interferes with valid law enforcement in-
terests. This Article suggests that a more appropriate remedy
would focus on the two sources of the problem: lawyers' initial
failure to inform clients about the limits of confidentiality and
the subsequent secrecy in which the subpoenaed testimony
takes place. Providing clients with access to their lawyers'
grand jury statements would assure clients that the lawyers are
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 4.5 (1987); PA. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.10 (1988); R.I. SuP. CT. R. 47 (Rule 3.8(f)) (1988);
TENN. SuP. CT. R. 8 (DR 7-103) (1987); VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:12 (1987); cf. In re
Almond, 50 Crim L. Rep. (BNA) 1532, 1532 (R.I. Mar. 18, 1992) (rejecting peti-
tion to grant waiver from new Rhode Island rule for federal prosecutions).
Several other jurisdictions, including Florida, are in the process of considering
similar changes.
4. See D.C. Adopts New Ethics Rules, Permits Non-Lawyer Partners, 6
Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 3, at 53, 55 (Mar. 14, 1990) (re-
porting District of Columbia's rejection of Model Rule 3.8(f)); New York's
Courts Adopt Changes to Ethics Rules, 6 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) No. 9, at 172, 175 (June 6, 1990) (reporting New York's rejection
of Model Rule 3.8(f)); see also Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd., 764 F. Supp. 328,
337-41 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (rejecting the applicability of its state attorney subpoena
rule to federal prosecutions); Illinois Rejects Amending Rule to Cover Subpoe-
nas to Lawyers, 5 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 6, at 106, 106-
08 (Apr. 12, 1989) (reporting the Illinois Supreme Court's rejection of an attor-
ney subpoena rule proposed by state bar association).
After initially rejecting a similar rule, see id., the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted Model Rule 3.8(f) on November 20, 1991. ILL. RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDucT Rule 3.8(c) (1990) (added 1991). Federal prosecutors
promptly filed suit to enjoin the rule's enforcement, Foreman v. Attorney Re-
gistration and Disciplinary Comm'n, No. 91-C8257 (N.D. ill. filed Dec. 24,
1991), and state prosecutors asked the Illinois Supreme Court to reconsider
adoption of the rule. In re Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(c),
No. MR-8038 (Ill. filed Dec. 24, 1991). As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court
stayed enforcement of the rule. In re Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct,
Rule 3.8(c), No. MR-8038 (Ill. Dec. 27, 1991) (order staying enforcement of
Rule 3.8(c)). The federal lawsuit has been dismissed with prejudice pending
the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling on the merits. Foreman v. Attorney Regis-
tration and Disciplinary Comm'n, No. 91-C8257 (N.D. IM. Dec. 30, 1991) (order
of dismissal).
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keeping their word and acting in the clients' best interests.
This Article illustrates that opening the grand jury to clients of
attorney-witnesses would help secure attorney-client relation-
ships without damaging the grand jury's traditional investiga-
tive role.
I. BACKGROUND
Over the past decade, prosecutors increasingly have re-
sorted to the tactic of subpoenaing lawyers to appear as wit-
nesses before the grand jury.5 Although the recent practice has
provoked concern about the continued vitality of the attorney-
client privilege, in fact lawyers have always been subject to
compulsory disclosure of information that might incriminate
their client.6 Communications relating to ongoing crimes or
past crimes in which the client has used the lawyer's services
fall within the "crime-fraud" exception to the privilege.7 Infor-
5. See Seymour Glanzer & Paul R. Taskier, Attorneys Before the Grand
Jury: Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client's Identity,
75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070, 1070 & nn.1-2 (1984) (referring to and cit-
ing authority for the recent onslaught of attorney subpoenas); Stern & Hoff-
man, supra note 1, at 1787, 1789 (discussing and citing authority for the
"explosion" of attorney subpoenas); Robert N. Weiner, Federal Grand Jury
Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Prposal for Reform, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 95
(1985) (noting and citing authority for the trend of increasing resort to subpoe-
nas). In United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1986), vacated, 832
F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc), the court reviewed statistics from the U.S.
Justice Department and concluded that the Department's current practice of
issuing 50-100 attorney subpoenas per year reflected a significant increase. Id.
at 658.
6. The information discussed here may be encompassed by attorney-cli-
ent confidentiality. The Model Rules, for example, recognize only a limited
"crime-fraud" exception to confidentiality. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6(b) (1983). The fact that information is confidential
does not render the information immune from disclosure under subpoena or
court order. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6 cmt.
(1983) (a lawyer must comply with a court order to disclose); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1981) (a lawyer may disclose
when required by law or court order). It is the attorney-client privilege which
governs the testimony that grand juries may procure.
7. Wigmore's classic definition of the attorney-client privilege states:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2292, at 554 (J.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). Virtually all jurisdictions recognize some form of
"crime-fraud" exception. This exception is defined most succinctly in the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, which provide that there is no privilege when "the
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mation regarding the client's identity8 or payment of fees9 ordi-
narily is considered unprivileged even if it implicates the client
in conspiracy or white collar crimes. An attorney who is ac-
cused of participating in criminal activity may use information
furnished by the client to exonerate herself; 0 the client cannot
raise the privilege to prevent disclosure." Conversely, the at-
services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to com-
mit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known
to be a crime or fraud." UNIF. R. EviD. 502(D)(1) (1974). The exception ap-
plies even when the lawyer is unaware of the client's plans. See In re Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d 793, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548
F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977). Some courts also have interpreted the excep-
tion expansively to apply to communications about past crimes when those
communications are inseparable from information about a prospective crime.
See United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 1984). For a general
discussion of the privilege and its exceptions, see Fred C. Zacharias, Rethink-
ing Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351, 365 & nn.62-63, 371 & n.91 (1989)
(citing authorities).
8. See, e.g., Phaksuan v. United States (In re Osterhoudt), 722 F.2d 591,
592 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that the privilege does not encompass
the client's identity); In re Freeman, 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (same); In re Twist, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); Behr-
ens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948) (same); see also Glanzer &
Taskier, supra note 5, at 1076-80 & n.35; Matthew Zwerling, Federal Grand Ju-
ries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Cient Privilege, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1263, 1282-86 (1976) (citing authorities). Some courts have held, however,
that the attorney client privilege covers the client's identity when disclosure
would be tantamount to disclosure of the attorney's communications, In re Du-
rant, 723 F.2d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984), or
would provide the last link in incriminating the defendant, In re Pavlick, 680
F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633
(9th Cir. 1960); see also In re DeGuerin, 926 F.2d 1423, 1431 (5th Cir. 1991)
(noting the narrow application of the privilege).
9. See, e.g., Doe v. United States (In re Shargel), 742 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir.
1984) (upholding subpoena inquiring into fee arrangement); In re Witnesses
Before the Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the priv-
ilege includes fee information only where "disclosure would result in the dis-
closure of confidential communications"); In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 1260
(11th Cir. 1982) (holding fee information not privileged); United States v.
Jones (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 517 F.2d 666, 674-75 (5th Cir. 1975) (up-
holding an attorney subpoena seeking information regarding the payment of
bond and fees); see also Zwerling, supra note 8, at 1286-90.
10. Throughout this Article, I refer to the defense lawyer/potential wit-
ness in the female gender. For balance, I treat other actors in the process (e.g.,
clients and prosecutors) as male.
11. See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190,
1194-96 (2d Cir.) (rejecting claim that lawyer must keep silent in defense of
civil suit), cert denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., Inc.,
434 F. Supp. 171, 188 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (permitting attorney charged as aider
and abettor to reveal privileged information to the extent "necessary to his de-
fense"); United States v. Amrep Corp., 418 F. Supp. 473, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(permitting general counsel to reveal privileged corporate documents in order
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torney may not invoke the client's privilege as a shield against
her own liability.'2 Thus, with the modern expansion of crimi-
nal law to more activities in which lawyers are intimately in-
volved, prosecutors increasingly have looked to lawyers for
information."3
The response by the bar and scholarly commentators has
been uniformly negative.' 4 The issuance of grand jury subpoe-
nas to defense attorneys has significant costs. The mere fact
that counsel must appear in the grand jury room, even to assert
the attorney-client privilege, can drive a wedge between the
lawyer and client. The client may become suspicious of
whether the lawyer has truly remained silent.15 The client may
to exonerate self). The professional codes all recognize a similar exception to
confidentiality rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule
1.6(b)(2) & cmt. (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(C)(4) (1981).
12. See In re Special Grand Jury (H), 640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that the attorney-client privilege belongs only to the client); In re FMC
Corp., 604 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); cq. In re Doe, 602 F. Supp. 603,
607-08 (D.R.I. 1985) (holding that, where both attorney and client are involved
in fraud, work product privilege is negated).
13. See, e.g., David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Trutk The Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C. L.
REV. 443, 473 (1986) ("'The recent emphasis on white-collar crime presents
prosecutors with new temptations to make the examination of attorneys an in-
tegral part of their investigations."); Ellen R. Peirce & Leonard J. Colamarino,
Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution: Curbing the Practice of Is-
suing Grand Jury Subpoenas to Counsel for Targets of Investigations, 36 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 821, 829-30 (1985) (discussing a relationship between the expansion
in the criminal law and the increased use of subpoenas and citing authorities);
Cramton & Udell, supra note 1, at 114-16 (detailing new laws which contribute
to an increase in attorney subpoenas).
14. See, e.g., William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
781, 874-75 (1988) [hereinafter Genego Survey] (describing the threat of attor-
ney subpoenas on the adversary process in the context of an empirical survey);
William J. Genego, Prosecutorial Control Over a Defendant's Choice of Coun-
sel, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 17, 18 (1987) [hereinafter Genego, Prosecutorial
Control] (describing attorney subpoenas as part of a serious "threat ... to the
adversary process"); Marjorie E. Gross, The Long Process of Change: The 1990
Amendments to the New York Code of Professional Responsibility, 18 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 283, 320-22 (1990) (discussing a resolution approved by the New
York bar, but rejected by New York courts, that would limit attorney subpoe-
nas); Stern & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 96 n.4, 133 (noting that "prosecutors'
enthusiasm for subpoenaing their legal adversaries has exceeded its appropri-
ate bounds" and discussing the extensive opposition to attorney subpoenas);
Thomas K. Foster, Note, Grand Jury Subpoenas of a Target's Attorney: The
Need for a Preliminary Showing, 20 GA. L. REV. 747, 750-52 (1986) (noting the
grand jury critics' charge of prosecutorial abuse in the attorney subpoena
procedure).
15. See In re Sturgis, 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (discussing how
an attorney's presence in the grand jury room may plant "doubts in the cli-
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doubt the lawyer's loyalty in appearing against him, particu-
larly if the lawyer initially exaggerated the extent of her duty
of confidentiality. 16 To the extent the lawyer must answer
some questions (either before or after a judicial ruling on a mo-
tion to quash), the likely chill upon the attorney-client trust re-
lationship increases. 17 As potential clients become aware of the
possibility of lawyer testimony, they may come to withhold in-
formation from their attorneys' 8 or desist from retaining coun-
sel during the grand jury process.19
A valid subpoena for testimony creates a related set of
problems for the attorney. When the grand jury's investigation
calls into question the propriety of the attorney's own conduct,
the attorney's interests may conflict with the client's.20 If the
lawyer is likely to become a witness against her client at trial,
ent's mind"); see also Weiner, supra note 5, at 103 ("[S]ecrecy of... grand jury
proceedings may fuel [the client's] suspicions."); Foster, supra note 14, at 756
n.41 ("The client may suspect that his attorney's testimony led the grand jury
to indict him.").
16. Consider the following scenario:
Client Trusting consults attorney Careless regarding a pending
federal investigation. Careless tells Trusting "everything you say is
confidential." Trusting then informs Careless of his involvement in a
narcotics ring. Trusting gives Careless a $10,000 retainer, paid in cash.
Two months later, the grand jury issues a subpoena to Careless.
When Careless tells Trusting that information regarding fees is
ordinarily unprivileged and that the information that Trusting con-
fided about ongoing crimes may be subject to the "crime-fraud" ex-
ception, Trusting will feel betrayed. Careless's belated promise to
assert the privilege whenever possible will not keep Trusting from
doubting Careless's loyalty, competence, and word.
17. In re Harvey, 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (4th Cir.) (noting the chilling ef-
fect on communications from the client, "especially if the client is indicted"),
vacated, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc). As Robert Weiner points out,
however, the degree to which an attorney subpoena chills the attorney-client
relationship inevitably "varies with the circumstances in which the subpoena
issues." Weiner, supra note 5, at 109. A subpoena limited to documents or fee
information may not call for information that the client considers intimate or
highly confidential. Id.
18. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1794 (arguing that clients will
hesitate to confide and lawyers will hesitate to probe for information); c.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("[mlf the client knows that
damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney fol-
lowing disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client
would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer.").
19. See In re Shargel (Doe v. United States), 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984)
(expressing concern that the lack of privilege covering the disclosure of client
identity "may discourage some persons from seeking legal advice at all"); see
also Foster, supra note 14, at 757 (noting the possibility that clients will
"forego representation during the grand jury proceedings").
20. Suppose, for example, that the grand jury threatens to indict the law-
yer for accepting tainted fees or for prpviding legal advice to the client's ongo-
[Vol. 76:917
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another conflict of interest develops.21 The prosecutor's action
in subpoenaing the lawyer to the grand jury therefore raises
the possibility that the lawyer may have to withdraw or be dis-
qualified.22 The client's constitutional right to choose and re-
tain his counsel is thereby diminished.23
ing criminal enterprise. See supra note 16. The lawyer inevitably will be
tempted to defend her conduct at her client's expense.
Under the Model Rules, a conflict of interest is defined as a situation in
which representation of a client "may be materially limited... by the lawyer's
own interests." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCr Rule 1.7(b) (1983);
see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A) (1981)
(providing that a conflict exists when "the exercise of [a lawyer's] professionaljudgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his
own financial, business, property, or personal interests"). When a lawyer's
own conduct is the subject of a grand jury investigation, the lawyer's judgment
almost automatically will be affected. Even if the lawyer and client both deny
wrongdoing, the lawyer has a potential interest in shifting the blame (perhaps
to his client), plea bargaining, and maintaining appearances to avoid disbar-
ment and loss of reputation. A series of scenarios in which accusations against
attorneys have caused such conflicts of interest are discussed in Earl J. Silbert,
The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-aent Privilege and Work-Prod-
uct Doctrine, the Lawyer's Obligations of Disclosure, and the Lawyer's Re-
sponse to Accusation of Wrongful Conduct, 23 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 351, 351 n.2
(1986).
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rules 1.16, 3.7 (1983)
(defining the circumstances when a lawyer must withdraw in order to prevent
a violation of the rules); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
110, DR 5-102 (1981) (same).
22. Failure of a lawyer to withdraw voluntarily when a conflict of interest
develops may be grounds for disqualification by the court. Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (upholding the disqualification of a criminal de-
fense attorney, over the defendant's objection, on the basis of the court's inter-
ests in "ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical
standards of the profession" and "the rendition of just verdicts"); United
States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 654 (1.t Cir.) (noting that the service of a sub-
poena will generally require the defense counsel to withdraw), vacatdd, 832
F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc); In re Doe (Roe v. United States), 759 F.2d
968, 973 (2d Cir.) (stating that a government subpoena of an attorney was
"surely setting the stage for the attorney's ultimate disqualification"), vacated,
781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re
Sturgis, 412 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ('"e practice [of attorney
subpoenas] permits the government by unilateral action to create the possibil-
ity of a conflict of interest.., which may lead to a suspect's being denied his
choice of counsel by disqualification."); see also Stern & Hoffman, supra note
1, at 1790 n.23 (citing authorities).
23. See generally Foster, supra note 14, at 770-75 (arguing that attorney
subpoenas violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel).
Although Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989),
affirms that the Sixth Amendment encompasses some right to choose counsel,
id. at 624, the Court has clearly established that the right is limited and sub-
ject to the superior interest of the proper administration of justice. See Wheat
v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988); see also supra note 22 (quoting
Wheat).
19921
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Finally, critics of the attorney subpoena procedure lament
the potential for prosecutorial abuse.2 Although valid law en-
forcement reasons clearly exist for seeking attorney testimony,
some prosecutors may use attorney subpoenas simply to fish for
information or to gain a tactical advantage by reducing the de-
fense lawyer's effectiveness.25 Perhaps worse, some prosecu-
tors may employ the tactic selectively, to target defense lawyers
whom they dislike or who are more formidable adversaries. 26
For all of these reasons, calls for reform have been ram-
pant ever since the practice of subpoenaing lawyers to the
grand jury became common.27 In 1985, the U.S. Department of
Justice adopted internal guidelines restraining federal use of
such subpoenas,2s but this action did not quiet the critics.29 The
24. In a recent report, an ABA committee concluded that "[t]he unregu-
lated power to subpoena attorneys also carries with it the potential for mis-
chief inherent in any situation where one adversary can pummel his opponent
without violating the rules." ABA, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 6
(Feb. 1986) [hereinafter 1986 ABA Report]. A few instances of prosecutorial
abuse have been documented. See In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103,
107 (D.N.H.) (finding harassment), clff'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984). However,
commentators who have emphasized the potential for abuse have, for the most
part, simply assumed that it will occur in a significant number of cases. See
Zwerling, supra note 8, at 1264 (noting the "Department of Justice's gross mis-
use of grand juries"); Foster, supra note 14, at 752 ("In no other phase of the
grand jury system has prosecutorial abuse been more widely exercised.").
25. See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 654 (1st Cir.) (noting the
"potential for abuse" inherent in the "natural tendencies promoted by adver-
sarial postures"), vacated, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc). Reduced ef-
fectiveness arguably results from a decrease in client trust, an adverse effect
on the lawyer's professional judgment or zeal, and diversion of defense re-
sources. See David S. Rudolf & Thomas K. Maher, The Attorney Subpoena:
You Are Hereby Commanded to Betray Your Client, 1 CRiM. JUST., Spring
1986, at 14, 16 (noting defendant's difficulty in marshalling resources to fight
the attorney subpoena and mount the defense); Foster, supra note 14, at 770-75
(discussing different aspects of reduced effectiveness); cf. Williams v. District
Court, 700 P.2d 549, 553 (Colo. 1985) (noting that a lawyer who chooses to act
both as an advocate and as a witness "diminishes his effectiveness in both
roles").
26. See Genego Survey, supra note 14, at 783, 818-19 (analyzing claims by
lawyers that attorney subpoenas are used to target particular attorneys). In
civil litigation, tactical motions to disqualify attorneys have become routine.
See J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting
the need for judicial scrutiny of disqualification motions). The remedy has, for
the most part, consisted of judicial scrutiny of, and disfavor toward, such mo-
tions. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial
Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 72 n.118 (1991)
(citing authorities).
27. See, e.g., Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 13, at 824-25; Weiner, supra
note 5, at 97; Zwerling, supra note 8, at 1265; Foster, supra note 14, at 750-52.
28. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-
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guidelines do not affect state prosecutors and, in some respects,
leave significant loopholes even in the federal realm.30 The
continuing criticisms have led the ABA and several local juris-
dictions to adopt ethical rules forbidding prosecutors from sub-
poenaing attorneys to testify on matters relating to client
representation without first obtaining judicial approval. These
rules limit the availability of subpoenas, based on the need for
the information and the lack of alternative sources of
information.31
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CRITICS' CONCERNS
The following analysis addresses the crux of the calls for
reform, not peripheral issues concerning what form changes
should take, who should adopt them, and how they should be
administered.32 I accept the critics' complaints on their own
2.161(a), at 35-37 (Oct. 1, 1990) (added July 18, 1985) [hereinafter DOJ Guide-
lines] (section entitled, "Policy with Regard to the Issuance of Grand Jury or
Trial Subpoenas to Attorneys for Information Relating to the Representation
of Clients"). The guidelines direct U.S. Attorneys (1) to consider the potential
effect of attorney subpoenas on the attorney-client relationship, (2) to limit
their requests for subpoenas to cases where alternative sources of information
have proven fruitless and the information is probably needed, and (3) to seek
pre-issuance authorization for any subpoena from the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of the Criminal Division. Id.
29. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 14, at 320-22; Stern & Hoffman, supra note
1, at 1817-20.
30. The Department of Justice regulations are simply guidelines for self-
restraint. See generally Michael F. Orman, Note, A Critical Appraisal of the
Justice Department Guidelines for Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to Defense
Attorneys, 1986 DuKE L.J. 145, 165-74 (arguing that the guidelines provide a
prudent formula for self-restraint within a sphere recognized as the proper do-
main of executive discretion). They abjure any intent to create substantive
rights (in defendants or attorneys) or to create standards "enforceable at law."
DOJ Guidelines, supra note 28, § 9-2.161(a)(E), at 36. Nor do they contain any
mechanism for outside supervision. Finally, they provide that alternatives will
be pursued only if the investigation will not be impaired. Id. §§ 9-2.161(a)(B),
(C), at 36.
31. See supra note 3 (citing recently enacted rules in six states). Past and
current reform proposals by the bar are analyzed in Stern & Hoffman, supra
note 1, at 1820-24.
32. One could impose limits on prosecutorial use of attorney subpoenas
through the exercise of judicial supervisory authority, administrative guide-
lines, legislation, or (as most current proposals suggest) rules adopted in the
local professional code. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
(Dorokee Co. v. United States), 697 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1983) (suggesting
that a preliminary showing of relevance and need is appropriate); In re Scho-
field, 507 F.2d 963, 964-65 (3d Cir.) (requiring prosecutors to make a prelimi-
nary showing of relevance and proper purpose, and allowing a court to weigh
the need before issuing an attorney subpoena), cert denied, 421 U.S. 1015
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terms; I assume the validity of the law regarding attorney-cli-
ent privilege, choice of counsel, and general subpoena power of
prosecutors and the grand jury.33 I focus simply on whether
the potential effect on client trust justifies the proposed limits
on prosecutorial discretion to call attorneys to the grand jury
stand.
Conversely, this Article's analysis does not consider the un-
stated, but possibly legitimate, functions that reducing the
number of attorney subpoenas might serve.4 Any reform that
(1975); HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, FEDERAL PROSECUTORIAL Au-
THORiTY IN A CHANGING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT. MORE ATTENTION REQUIRED,
H.R. REP. No. 986, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1990) (declining to recommend leg-
islation, but recognizing a potential need for it); DOJ Guidelines, supra note
28, § 9-2.161(a), at 35-37 (imposing legally unenforceable internal limits on fed-
eral attorney subpoenas). As a theoretical matter, the legitimacy of interfer-
ing with the grand jury's traditional province seems different, depending on
the approach. Legislatures, for example, clearly would be justified in recasting
the grand jury's investigative role, and, indeed, good arguments have been
made for such a change. Similarly, courts unquestionably are empowered to
amend the elements of common law attorney-client privilege. In contrast, im-
plementing remedies for internal flaws of the grand jury system or changing
the substantive law of privilege may exceed the authority of ethical code draft-
ers. Arguably, code drafters must confine themselves to regulating conduct
within the legal system as it exists and to framing lawyers' attitudes toward
the system. C. Geoffrey C. Hazard, The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J.
1239, 1249-1260 (1991) (noting the increasing "legalization" of the codes).
33. Most current reform proposals, although bemoaning the failure of
grand juries and the attorney-client privilege to protect defendants' interests,
do not purport to make systemic or substantive changes. They rest almost ex-
clusively upon the impact of attorney subpoenas upon the attorney-client rela-
tionship and attempt to limit or undo that effect. See, e.g., ABA Standing
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and Section of Criminal Jus-
tice, Report to the House of Delegates 2, 5-6 (Feb. 1990) [hereinafter 1990 ABA
Report] (recommending addition of Model Rule 3.8(f) relying on client con-
cerns and systemic effects of underestimating them); Peirce & Colamarino,
supra note 13, at 833-36 (identifying client concerns and proposing a judicially
imposed preliminary showing rule); Stern & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1789-94,
1825-54 (discussing loyalty concerns and alternative methods of limiting issu-
ances of attorney subpoenas, then proposing strict limits); Weiner, supra note
5, at 102-10, 125-33 (discussing client interests and proposing administrative
guidelines); Foster, supra note 14, at 755-58, 775-79 (identifying client concerns
and proposing a judicially imposed preliminary showing rule).
34. Reducing the number of attorney subpoenas would, for example, pro-
tect attorneys' legal practices. See Genego Survey, supra note 14, at 815-19
(describing the impact of prosecutorial practices directed at lawyers upon the
economic self-interest of the criminal defense bar). It also would mitigate
some of the dangers inherent in the grand jury's traditional discretion to in-
vestigate and might rectify the adversarial imbalance inherent in prosecutors'
unilateral ability to obtain criminal discovery from defense attorneys. See gen-
erally Genego, Prosecutorial Control, supra note 14, at 19-21 (analyzing
prosecutorial practices, including attorney subpoenas, for a perspective on
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prohibits or limits the use of attorney subpoenas will have the
indirect effect of preserving client interests. My concern here
is whether reforms relying on such an indirect approach are ad-
equately tailored to the specific problem the reforms purport to
address. In other words, I assume the reforms are truly aimed
at mitigating the impact of subpoenas on good attorney-client
relationships and ask whether society could achieve that goal
with less impact on the government's law enforcement inter-
ests in issuing valid subpoenas. Because proponents of reform
disclaim any intent to change the substantive law governing the
attorney-client privilege and clients' ability to retain lawyers
with conflicts of interest, I also do not consider the advantages
of changing those doctrines.
At the outset, it is important to recognize that the law com-
prising client "rights" approaches the attorney-client relation-
ship differently than do the professional codes. The codes set
ideal standards for legal practice.s At least some parts of the
codes elevate society's interest in creating and maintaining per-
fect attorney-client relationships to the status of a "prime direc-
tive."36 Because of confidentiality's contribution to enhancing
whether one adversary can exercise control over the other). Cf. Morgan
Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role
Theory To Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wisc. L. REv. 1, 33-65
(analyzing fee forfeiture proceedings in terms of their systemic impact on the
defense bar).
In proposing Model Rule 3.8(f), the ABA did express its concern that the
increasing number of attorney subpoenas might threaten the existence of a
high quality criminal defense bar. 1990 ABA Report, supra note 33, at 2, 5-6;
see also Genego Survey, supra note 14, at 816-17 (suggesting that prosecutorial
targeting of defense lawyers may drive them from practice). Even assuming
that speculative effect, it does not support the proposed remedy any more than
it would support an artificial numerical limit on subpoenas. Providing judicial
review neither focuses on the reasons why subpoenas affect the bar's willing-
ness to provide representation (e.g., fear of reprisal for representing clients ag-
gressively) nor reacts to those reasons. In any event, the dire predictions
concerning the willingness of criminal defense lawyers to practice have not
been borne out by an exodus from the defense bar.
35. See Zacharias, supra note 26, at 107 n.259 (discussing the hortatory
function of professional codes).
36. As Professor Fried notes: "[Tjhere is a profound theoretical tension
between the view of the attorney-client relationship implicit in the modern
law of privilege and the view of the relationship that underlies the ethical
duty of confidentiality as most attorneys understand it." Fried, supra note 13,
at 490; see also MoNROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 1-8 (1975) (arguing that a lawyer's ethical obligation to preserve client
confidences and trust is paramount in importance); Zacharias, supra note 7, at
355 n.18 (distinguishing the tradition underlying professional confidentiality
from the tradition underlying the attorney-client privilege).
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client trust and belief in attorney loyalty,37 professional confi-
dentiality rules recognize few countervailing interests.-S Other
ethical provisions-for example, those prescribing the duty of
zealousness---arguably also treat attorney loyalty as paramount
in importance.39
Once matters reach the litigation stage, however, the codes
recognize that legal rules take precedence over professional ide-
als.40 In defining client rights, the law takes into account cli-
37. See ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT 82 (Proposed Alternative Draft
1981) (explaining the instrumental bases for confidentiality); see also CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmIcs § 6.1.3 (1986) (analyzing instrumental
bases); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal De-
fense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1473 (1966)
(arguing that confidentiality's justifications make it the foundation of an or-
derly adversarial process).
38. The Model Rules, for example, recognize exceptions to confidentiality
only to protect the lawyer, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule
1.6(b)(2) (1983), and when a client's future crime is likely to cause imminent
death or substantial bodily harm, id. Rule 1.6(b)(1). The Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility is not much more liberal. See MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1981) (allowing disclosure to
prevent future crime). As I have discussed elsewhere, empirical studies sug-
gest that neither clients nor lawyers believe the rules give adequate regard to
third-party or societal interests. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 392-96.
39. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 7-101(A)(1)
(1981) (requiring a lawyer to seek all lawful objectives of his client by reason-
ably available means); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUC Rule 1.3 &
cmt. (1983) (requiring lawyer to act with zeal). Although the codes sometimes
authorize lawyers to temper their zeal, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983) ("[A] lawyer is not bound to press for
every advantage."), the duty to pursue the best results for clients and set aside
concern for third parties and the truth pervades the rules, see, e.g., DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 50-91 (1988) (discussing the effects of the ad-
versariness on "principles" of lawyer partisanship and nonaccountability);
Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth. An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1031, 103541 (1975) (arguing against an overly partisan approach to legal
representation).
40. For example, the strict confidentiality rules in both the Code and the
Model Rules provide exceptions when a court orders disclosure of information
(i.e., the information is unprivileged). MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCr Rule 1.6 cmt. (1983) ("The lawyer must comply with the final orders of a
court or other tribunal... requiring the lawyer to give information about the
client [and] a lawyer may be obligated or permitted by other provisions of law
to give information about a client."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1981) ("A lawyer may reveal... confidences or secrets
when . . . required by law or court order."). Similarly, the codes recognize
that, once a lawyer is before a tribunal, she must temper her zeal to the extent
necessary to function as an officer of the court. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983) (limiting permissible arguments); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106 (1981) (requiring that a law-
yer make certain disclosures and refrain from particular conduct even if
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ents' interests in a suitable attorney-client relationship. Yet it
also factors into the balance countervailing societal concerns
that, in some circumstances, outweigh clients' desire for unfet-
tered attorney loyalty.
The basic attorney-client privilege, for example, rests on
the same values as those underlying the confidentiality pre-
scribed in the codes.41 However, the definition of and excep-
tions to the privilege incorporate the interests of opposing
litigants in obtaining information.42 The exceptions reflect the
conclusion that a standard of total secrecy is not necessary to
maintain clients' general sense of attorney loyalty or to assure
effective representation throughout the legal system.4 3
Similarly, the law acknowledges clients' interests in select-
ing attorneys they trust, maintaining a good working relation-
ship with those attorneys, and being able to keep the attorneys
through the case.44 But, again, courts have rejected the notion
that clients are entitled to an attorney who is free of responsi-
against her client's best interests); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT
Rule 3.3 (requiring "candor" towards the tribunal); Fried, supra note 13, at 497
(discussing the fact that both codes elevate the lawyer's duty to the court
above the duty to the client).
41. See James A. Gardner, A Reevaluation of the Attorney-Client Privi-
ege, 8 VILL. L. REV. 279, 289-339 (1963) (describing the ways in which justifica-
tions for the privilege mirror those underlying confidentiality); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Cient Privilege, 66 CAL. L.
REV. 1061, 1069-91 (1978) (same).
42. For example, the privilege applies only to communications specifically
given or received for the purpose of obtaining or communicating legal advice.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass
1950) (setting forth Judge Wyzansld's oft-cited definition and explanation of
the privilege). Similarly, exceptions like the "crime-fraud" exception and lib-
erally interpreted "waiver" and "abandonment" exceptions often enable op-
posing litigants to pierce the privilege. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 371 n.91
(citing authorities).
43. In interpreting the exceptions and in balancing the client interests
against societal and third-party interests in ferreting out the truth, courts con-
sciously have construed the privilege narrowly. Weil v. Investment/Indicators,
Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981); Diversified In-
dus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977); Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cerit denied, 375 U.S. 929
(1963); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546,
547 (D.D.C. 1970). But see 1990 ABA Report, supra note 33, at 6 (asserting that
the mere issuance of a subpoena directed toward confidential but unprivileged
information undermines client trust).
44. See, ag., Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617,
624 (1989) (acknowledging the client's right to choose counsel); United States
v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 923 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing the importance of the
client's right to choose counsel); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064,
1070-72 (2d Cir. 1982) (same).
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bility to legal rules or other societal concerns.4 5 Courts have
held that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment interests in choosing
counsel and maintaining a "meaningful client relationship" are
limited.46
What all of this means is that, as a matter of substantive
law, clients' rights are restricted to a far greater extent than is
reflected in the professional codes. Clients have a constitu-
tional right to choose counsel, but no right to keep counsel if
withdrawal or disqualification is appropriate.47 Clients have a
statutory or common law right to maintain the secrecy of com-
munications with their attorneys, but no right to prevent the
disclosure of such communications in the context of judicial
proceedings when the information is unprivileged or subject to
an exception." The difference between clients' legal rights and
client interests reflected in the professional codes may present
serious problems for lawyers in gauging what they should
promise clients at the outset of the representation. But the
mere existence of ideals and standards of conduct in the codes
is not a basis for refusing disclosure of information in court.
Stated another way, when a grand jury seeks pertinent infor-
mation about a client for valid law enforcement reasons and
legal rules do not exempt that information from disclosure, the
client's status as a client creates no inherent entitlement to pre-
clude access.
Nevertheless, grand jury subpoenas directed to counsel im-
plicate valid client concerns. Clients are entitled to attorney
loyalty, so long as loyalty is defined as "not acting against the
client's interests unless required to do so by law or superior
professional mandates." Clients may expect to receive the
maximum effort of their lawyers, including full assertion of the
attorney-client privilege and preservation of confidentiality
45. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176 (1986) (stating that the
right to effective counsel does not mandate violations of ethical rules requiring
attorneys to prevent client perjury).
46. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983) (holding that a criminal
defendant has no constitutional right to a "meaningful attorney-client rela-
tionship"); United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1072 (2d Cir. 1982)
(stating that the client's choice of counsel is limited by the government's inter-
est in the "fair and proper administration of justice"); United States v. Hobson,
672 F.2d 825, 828 (11th Cir.) (stating that client choice is subject to the overrid-
ing interest in "public confidence in the integrity of our legal system"), cert
denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982).
47. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162-63 (1988) (stating that a cli-
ent has no right to keep an attorney who has a conflict of interest).
48. See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
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when legally possible.49 For "loyalty" and "zeal" to produce the
societal benefits to which they are geared, clients also must be
allowed to know, or be reassured, that this loyalty and zeal ex-
ist.5° Finally, some attorney subpoenas stem from prosecutorial
abuse which, if exposed, would strip the grand jury of the au-
thority to seek otherwise confidential information.5 1 Clients
justifiably can claim an inherent right to an opportunity to pro-
test such misconduct before it produces harm.
With this background, let us consider what should happen
in the absence of any reform of attorney subpoena rules. What
can an effective, loyal defense counsel do to ensure that her cli-
ent's "rights" are vindicated? In a world of ideal client repre-
sentation, what would the client get?
The first important step comes at the beginning of the rep-
resentation, when the lawyer explains the nature of the attor-
ney-client relationship and describes what the attorney may
keep secret. Because a client's sense of loyalty depends, in part,
on not feeling "betrayed" by a lawyer who later reveals infor-
mation, the effective lawyer owes it to her client to define the
contours of privilege and confidentiality accurately.52 This duty
49. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1983)
(requiring a lawyer called to testify concerning a client to invoke the privilege
when it is "applicable," unless the client has waived the privilege); see also
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.) (noting the attorney's
obligation to assert the privilege), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). In the
grand jury context, an effective lawyer would assert the privilege by moving to
quash the subpoena whenever the privilege arguably applies. See infra text
accompanying notes 55-56.
50. In theory, clients who trust lawyers will use them to resolve disputes
and cooperate with them in a way that enhances effective representation.
When this occurs, society can maintain an orderly and efficient adversarial sys-
tem of justice. See Zacharias, supr note 7, at 358 (citing authorities which
support this argument). Under this "instrumental" view, procedures must ex-
ist to make clients aware that lawyers are trustworthy, or else clients simply
will not confide. But see id. at 363-67, 386-87 (questioning the degree to which
confidentiality furthers client trust when lawyers fail to explain confidential-
ity at the outset of representation).
51. Federal district courts have authority to quash grand jury subpoenas
when "compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive." FED. R. CaRM. P.
17(c). Courts have used this provision to prevent subpoenas designed to harass
a prospective attorney-witness or her client. See, e.g., In re Legal Servs. Ctr.,
615 F. Supp. 958, 969-70 (D. Mass. 1985) (quashing an "unreasonable" attorney
subpoena); In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103, 107 (D.N.H.) (quashing
an attorney subpoena in part because of the prosecutor's "flip comment" re-
garding the potential effect of the subpoena on the attorney's practice), aff'd,
751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
52. See supra note 16. I and others have written about the importance of
an accurate promise of confidentiality at the beginning of the representation.
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arises because a lawyer's failure to tell a client about an excep-
tion (e.g., "crime-fraud") does not eliminate the exception
when an opposing party seeks to invoke it.53 In all aspects of
litigation, clients rely on their lawyers at their own peril.54
When the grand jury issues a subpoena to the lawyer, the
lawyer is obliged to maximize her client's interests in keeping
the information secret. The good lawyer would assert the at-
torney-client privilege if it is even arguably applicable, move to
quash the subpoena if the government does not adequately
limit the subpoena's scope, and pave the way for the client to
A lawyer who tells her client, "everything you say is confidential," misleads
the client. She also sets the stage for a situation in which she must disclose
and, in the client's eyes, betray the trust she has encouraged. See, e.g.,
Zacharias, supra note 7, at 386-87; see also Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 675-744 (1990) (analyzing the absence of lawyer candor
in a variety of situations). An overbroad promise of confidentiality neglects
the fact that the lawyer may have to disclose unprivileged information the cli-
ent provides. The advice also ignores the existence of privilege exceptions that
come into play once the representation moves from the confidential "advice
stage" to the litigation context.
In the attorney subpoena context, the expansion of professional confiden-
tiality rules (as in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct) serves to
heighten "the tension between the testimonial disclosures mandated by the
crime-fraud exception and attorneys' understanding of their ethical obliga-
tions." Fried, supra note 13, at 492. Because lawyers are responsible for pro-
tecting clients' rights as they exist under the law, it is part and parcel of their
employment to recognize the tension and to avoid clients' misunderstanding
regarding what they may safely confide. See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING
WHITE COLLAR CRImE 103-04 (1985) (explaining why lawyers should, to en-
hance their effectiveness, empower their clients to avoid disclosures that
would damage the representation); cf Fried, supra note 13, at 498 ("Perhaps
the legal profession must take collective responsibility for bringing the attor-
ney-client privilege more nearly into harmony with its own view of what is
necessary and ethically appropriate.").
53. See, e.g., In re Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam) (holding that a lawyer's inadvertent disclosure of documents despite
the client's instruction to maintain the privilege binds the client), cert denied,
444 U.S. 915 (1979).
54. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,
602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that a court may dismiss a client's
claim for counsel's gross negligence in responding to discovery requests); see
also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416-418 (1988) (holding that a criminal de-
fense lawyer's failure to provide a witness list precludes the client from calling
defense witnesses); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962) (finding a
counsel's disregard of professional obligations attributable to client). Of
course, when a lawyer's actions injure her client, the client may be able to re-
cover against the lawyer in a malpractice or other civil suit. In the criminal
context, a client may seek reversal on ineffective assistance of counsel
grounds. But cf Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (holding that a client
may not challenge a conviction on the basis that his lawyer failed to raise valid
claims urged by the client).
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appeal a negative ruling on the motionSS Once the legal pro-
ceedings are complete and the validity of the subpoena is up-
held, however, the lawyer must comply.5
At this point, or earlier, the effective lawyer should con-
sider the need to withdraw from the representation. Under
most professional codes, the lawyer may not continue her rep-
resentation of a client if she is likely to become a witness
against the client 57 or if her decisions in the grand jury room
may be affected by her personal interestsSS She best serves her
client by withdrawing early, both to prevent further damage to
the client5 9 and to obtain the new attorney's supporting expla-
nation of her conduct. 60 If this explanation comes before the
grand jury testimony occurs, the client's sense of betrayal can
55. See supra note 49 (citing authorities). As a general matter, when a pu-
tative grand jury witness loses a motion to quash, he must either comply with
the subpoena or be cited for contempt in order to appeal. United States v.
Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-28
(1940). In Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), the Supreme Court es-
tablished an exception for situations in which the witness seeks to preserve a
privilege for a third party. I&. at 12. In the attorney subpoena context, courts
have applied the Pe-rman exception to allow the client to intervene and ap-
peal "when circumstances make it unlikely that [the] attorney would risk a
contempt citation in order to allow immediate review of a claim of privilege."
In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also In re Berkley &
Co., 629 F.2d. 548, 551-52 (8th Cir. 1980) (permitting a corporation to appeal an
order directing its attorney to disclose documents); In re FMC Corp., 604 F.2d
798, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1979). A few courts have, however, denied the applicability
of Perlman. See In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1980) (suggesting
that an attorney must risk contempt charges to preserve her client's appeal).
See generally Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 5, at 1075-76 (citing and discussing
authorities).
56. See supra note 40.
57. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIUTY DR 5-102(B) (1981);
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 3.7 (1983).
58. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY DR 5-101(A) (1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
59. Delay in withdrawing may increase the client's costs in retaining and
bringing a new lawyer up to speed, undermine the client's plea bargaining po-
sition, or increase the client's sense of betrayal when the client later learns
that the lawyer was representing him despite impaired, or apparently im-
paired, judgment. In deciding when to withdraw, a lawyer continues to be
bound by her obligation to protect the client's interests. She therefore must
take reasonable steps to mitigate the negative consequences of withdrawal
upon the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 cmt.
(1983) (noting the duty to mitigate).
60. The second attorney has every incentive to explain why the first attor-
ney's withdrawal was appropriate. Because the second attorney already has
the business, there is no reason to backbite. If the attorney can demonstrate
that the first attorney's conduct does not reflect a betrayal, the client may be
more willing to trust other lawyers, including his current representative.
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be minimized and the ability of the new attorney to establish a
good attorney-client relationship is enhanced.6 1
The effective attorney thus is in a position to safeguard
most of her client's "rights." She can act loyally, assert privi-
lege and confidentiality, and arrange for a pre-testimony oppor-
tunity to be heard in opposition to the subpoena, either on
privilege or prosecutorial misconduct grounds. By conducting
herself appropriately from the outset of the representation, she
can also reduce the danger of any potential conflict of interest
or need to withdraw. The only facets of perfect representation
she cannot control are those affected by the client's interest in
knowing what occurs in the grand jury room.62
Any reform proposal that is truly directed at preserving ap-
propriate attorney-client relations must be measured against
this "ideal representation" that an effective, loyal attorney
would provide. To the extent a lawyer fails to preserve a cli-
ent's rights, the client has legal remedies. The client may pur-
sue a civil lawsuit, professional discipline, and, in criminal
cases, an appeal on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Nevertheless, reformers must recognize that lawyer ineffective-
ness is not a problem inherent in the nature of attorney sub-
poenas. Nor is the damage caused by ineffectiveness in the
grand jury context necessarily greater than in any other.6s
61. Of course, if the prosecutor subpoenas the replacement attorney, the
cycle begins anew and the effect on the attorney-client relationship may be
magnified. This potential problem, however, is probably a red herring. I have
found no reported cases in which a prosecutor has sought to subpoena or dis-
qualify lawyers sequentially. Presumably, courts would greet such tactics with
distrust.
62. Undoubtedly, the lawyer will tell the client what occurred in the
grand jury proceedings. Her assurances, however, may not do the trick. The
client will not necessarily believe that the lawyer asserted the privilege and
protected the client's interests fully. The client may believe that testifying
even with respect to unprivileged information, in and of itself, represented an
act of disloyalty. Arguably, the client will, as a result, trust the lawyer less in
the future.
63. I do not minimize or underestimate the practical impediments to prov-
ing malpractice, obtaining discipline, and establishing ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. My point is simply that the deficiencies in the existing reme-
dial mechanisms are evident with respect to all aspects of attorney-client rela-
tions. The attorney-subpoena situation is not so different as to merit a unique
prophylactic rule protecting clients' rights.
Outside of the grand jury context, for example, courts routinely bind cli-
ents to their attorneys' waiver of privilege, whether or not the waiver was in-
tentional or made after consultation. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 371 n.91
(citing authorities). Similarly, lawyers are empowered to give up clients'
claims and defenses. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 (1988) (noting
that, with some exceptions, a lawyer has "full authority to manage the conduct
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III. THE INADEQUACY OF PRE-ISSUANCE JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Proposals to curtail the use of attorney subpoenas have
taken a variety of approaches. Most conform in significant re-
spects to Model Rule 3.8(f). The essential provisions of Model
Rule 3.8(f) forbid prosecutors from issuing subpoenas to attor-
neys to obtain information "about a... client"'' without prior
judicial approval.65 The rule also requires courts to deny ap-
proval unless the prosecutor can demonstrate that the informa-
tion sought is unprivileged,6 "essential to the successful
completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution,"67 and
unavailable from any other source.6S Other proposals have ad-
ded the requirement that the prosecutor show that he has no
purpose to harass the attorney or client.69
Although short and limited in scope, Model Rule 3.8(f)
calls for a dramatic shift in the historical functioning of the
grand jury. Commentators have, for decades, questioned the
grand jury scheme and urged courts and legislatures to protect
grand jury targets.70 Nevertheless, lawmakers and judges
of the trial"). A trial lawyer's decision of whether to object to particular evi-
dence may make the difference between acquittal and conviction and often de-
termines a client's ability to appeal. See id. at 434 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(agreeing that a client sometimes is bound by the lawyer's tactical errors at
trial); see also infra note 83 (citing authorities). These situations all involve
potential damage to the client that is far less speculative than the damage that
may accrue from compliance with a valid subpoena to appear before the grand
jury. Yet, in each, clients are relegated to the traditional legal remedies when
they believe their lawyer has acted ineffectively.
64. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f) (1983) (added
1990). Other proposals cover information "obtained as a result of the attorney-
client relationship." See, eg., 1988 ABA Resolution, supra note 1, at 1853.
65. The 1986 ABA Resolution, supra note 1, would have required only an
ex parte hearing. The 1988 ABA Resolution, supra note 1, and Model Rule
3.8(f) call for a full adversarial proceeding.
66. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f)(1)(i) (1983) (ad-
ded 1990).
67. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f)(1)(ii) (1983) (ad-
ded 1990).
68. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(f)(1)(iii) (1983)
(added 1990).
69. See, e.g., 1988 ABA Resolution, supra note 1, at 1853.
70. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRmINAL PROCEDURE
§ 8.2(c), at 350-52 (1985) (summarizing the criticisms of the grand jury system);
see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN IN-
STITUTION ON TRIAL (1977) (reviewing the grand jury system and proposing re-
forms); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973); Michael E. Deutsch, The Improper Use of the Federal
Grand Jury: An Instrument for the Internment of Political Activists, 75 J.
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steadfastly have resisted imposing limits upon grand jury se-
crecy, discretion to cast a wide investigative net, and preroga-
tive to act free of outside interference.
In United States v. Dionisio,7 1 for example, the United
States Supreme Court abjured judicial authority to supervise
the reasonableness of grand jury subpoenas: "No grand jury
witness is 'entitled to set limits to the investigation that the
grand jury may conduct.' "72 The Court accorded grand juries
this broad discretion largely to avoid saddling them with "mini-
trials" and preliminary hearings that would impede or delay
their investigative functions.73 Although the Court acknowl-
edged that "[t]he grand jury may not always serve its historic
role as a protective bulwark standing... between the ordinary
citizen and an overzealous prosecutor," 74 the Court nonetheless
balanced the competing considerations and concluded that a
grand jury "must be free to pursue its investigations un-
hindered by external influence or supervision so long as it does
not trench upon the legitimate rights of any witness called
before it."175
The upshot of Dionisio and subsequent decisions76 is that
witnesses and targets have no general right to impede or test
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1159 (1984); William B. Lytton, Grand Jury Se-
crecy-Time for Reevaluation, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1100 (1984).
71. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
72. Id at 15 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)); see
also id at 16 (reasoning that "there is no more reason to require a preliminary
showing of reasonableness here than there would be in the case of any witness
who, despite the lack of any constitutional or statutory privilege, declined to
answer a question or comply with a grand jury request"). The Court, in recog-
nizing the grand jury's "broad investigative powers" because "a sufficient basis
for an indictment may only emerge at the end of the investigation," granted
the grand jury leeway to "act on tips, rumors, evidence offered by the prosecu-
tor, or their own personal knowledge." Id, at 15-16 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972)); see also Hendricks v. United States, 223 U.S. 178, 184
(1912) (holding an indictment not insufficient for lack of definiteness). The
facts of Dionisio involved an obvious "fishing expedition" by a grand jury that
had subpoenaed voice exemplars from approximately 20 persons in the hope of
matching them against the voices in wiretapped conversations. 410 U.S. at 3.
Yet the Court refused to intervene to protect the rights of the witnesses and
targets of the investigation. Id. at 18.
73. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 17.
74. Id-
75. Id. at 17-18.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-352 (1974) (re-
jecting a grand jury witness's right to invoke the exclusionary rule); United
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1973) (applying Dionisio in overruling a
lower court's decision to require a preliminary showing of reasonableness
before a grand jury could obtain handwriting exemplars).
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grand jury subpoenas. The decisions emphasize the need for se-
crecy and speed, both of which are compromised by judicial re-
view.7 7 Prosecutorial misconduct may still be challenged.78
Some courts will, in limited fashion or in extreme cases, enter-
tain a supported claim that a subpoena fails to seek relevant ev-
idence.79 But courts have shied even from suggesting a
universal requirement, such as that in the ABA proposals,
which would make prosecutors establish a threshold of need
before proceeding.8 0
However radical, reforms may still be justified if, in more
than a general way, they serve rights that clients have in
preventing lawyer testimony before the grand jury. Proposals
like the ABA's suggest two kinds of change. They establish
mandatory judicial procedures that must be followed before the
grand jury can require the attorney's testimony. And they. set
substantive standards for the issuance of a subpoena. To evalu-
ate the proposals, one must analyze each aspect in turn.
For the client who has an effective lawyer, creating a
77. See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 17 n.16 (discussing the problem of delay en-
gendered by the lower court ruling); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
362-363 (1956) (refusing to respond to a Fifth Amendment claim in part due to
the necessity for secrecy and speed in grand jury hearings).
78. See, eg., YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 668-69
(7th ed. 1990) (summarizing cognizable witness objections to subpoenas on the
grounds of prosecutorial misuse of the grand jury, noting the need for a prima
facie showing by the claimant, and citing authorities); see also In re Ellsberg
(United States v. Doe), 455 F.2d 1270, 1274 (1st Cir. 1972) (granting an indicted
defendant the right to challenge the continued use of the grand jury to build a
case against him); United States v. Pennsalt Chemicals Corp., 260 F. Supp. 171,
181 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (citing the need to balance the policy of grand jury discre-
tion against the need to ascertain whether there has been abuse).
79. See, e.g., In re Schofield, 507 F.2d 963, 964-965 (3d Cir.) (requiring an
affidavit with some preliminary showing supporting relevance of items sought
in any grand jury subpoena), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); see also In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Derokee Co. v. United States), 697 F.2d
277, 281 (10th Cir. 1983) (requiring showing of relevance and "proper purpose"
(quoting In re Schofield, 507 F.2d at 964)).
80. The United States Courts of Appeal for the Third and Tenth Circuits
have suggested that prosecutors may be expected to provide a preliminary
showing of relevance and "proper purpose" prior to issuing specific kinds of
grand jury subpoenas. See Derokee, 697 F.2d at 281; Schofield, 507 F.2d at 964-
65. Virtually all other courts have rejected that concept. See, e.g., In re Ander-
son, 906 F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 791
F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation
(Williams v. Mercer), 783 F.2d 1488, 1525 (11th Cir.), cert denied, 477 U.S. 904
(1986); In re Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 243 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 475 U.S.
1108 (1986); In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Weiner (Doe v.
United States), 754 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceeding
(Schofield v. United States), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983).
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mandatory judicial review procedure does not enhance the pro-
tection of any right. When an arguable claim of privilege ex-
ists, the effective lawyer will, under any scheme, assert the
client's position and move to quash. Because the good lawyer
will make the determination of whether to withdraw because of
a conflict of interest either at the point she receives, the sub-
poena or after a motion to quash, the judicial review process
also does not speed appropriate disqualifications.
In practice, the mandatory review procedure has two ef-
fects, neither of which is inherently necessary to vindicate cli-
ents' rights. First, it imposes an artificial obstacle to the whole
set of attorney subpoenas. By requiring grand juries to justify
each subpoena, the procedure slows the grand jury's investiga-
tion and undermines the secrecy that courts have considered
important to such investigations.81 Second, mandatory judicial
review protects clients who retain bad lawyers. It serves as a
prophylactic protection against counsel who are ineffective in
asserting their clients' privilege and who fail to file appropriate
motions to quash.
At first glance, simply creating an obstacle to subpoenas is
not even an arguably valid justification for reform. Although
the grand jury system often has been criticized, the current
proposals do not draw their logic (or popular support) from
over-arching flaws in the system. Presumably, any general re-
structuring of the pretrial investigative scheme should be ac-
complished through directed legislation rather than
professional rules adopted by the bar.
This "obstacle" function can, however, be viewed in a more
favorable light. By making subpoenas more difficult, the
ABA's reforms would reduce the likelihood that lawyers will
have to testify or withdraw for conflicts of interest. As an em-
pirical matter, more clients would be able to keep their law-
yers. Fewer would sense the possibility of attorney disloyalty.
Moreover, by imposing general restraints, the reforms would
help prevent prosecutorial misuse of the subpoena power in
cases where proof of abuse is difficult to find. Hence, the argu-
ment goes, the reforms maximize clients' rights and set a tone
discouraging subpoenas.
The difficulty with this approach lies in its failure to ac-
81. See Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1380 (1990) (discussing the
importance of grand jury secrecy); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356
U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958) (listing five objectives of grand jury secrecy, citing
Upited States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 1931)).
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knowledge adverse consequences of limits on prosecutorial and
grand jury discretion. Clients can be more secure in their law-
yers, but only because the government is artificially barred
from helpful information to which it may, as a substantive legal
matter, be entitled. The ABA rule and related proposals hin-
der the investigative process without even attempting to gear
the remedy to the reasons attorney subpoenas threaten the at-
torney-client relationship. Similarly, in shielding lawyers from
disqualification, the proposals do not focus on whether conflicts
of interest meriting disqualification preexist. Logically, one
should not adopt such a scattershot approach-with its concom-
itant law enforcement costs-unless one first concludes that
tailored remedies are unavailable.
The second function of the judicial review procedure-
preventing potentially ineffective representation by lawyers in
asserting the privilege-would help reassure clients that their
rights are being safeguarded. Traditionally, however, the crimi-
nal justice system has resisted "prophylactic" remedies that ap-
ply where the underlying concern (here, lawyer incompetence)
may be absent.8 2 Courts and lawmakers have not been willing
to safeguard defendants against errors or omissions by attor-
neys even in contexts where the potential harm to clients is
greater8s The reasons for this hard-heartedness are obvious.
82. See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417,
1449 (1985) (criticizing Miranda's use of a prophylactic rule); Joseph D. Grano,
Miranda's Constitutional Diftwulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U.
Cm. L. REv. 174, 176-181 (1988) [hereinafter Grano I] (arguing that the adop-
tion of prophylactic rules is an illegitimate exercise of judicial power); Joseph
D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article
III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 100, 123-156 (1985) [hereinafter Grano Ill
(arguing against the use of prophylactic rules); see also New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 655-58 (1984) (rejecting the application of Miranda's prophylactic
rule to protect the right against self-incrimination); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 106-107 n.9 (1977) (rejecting the dissent's call for a rule forbidding the
use of any suspect identification obtained through an impermissibly suggestive
procedure).
83. For example, courts ordinarily refuse to presume prejudice to a crimi-
nal defendant, even when he can show his lawyer has been ineffective. See,
ag., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). Similarly, in most
cases, defendants are precluded from appealing convictions when counsel has
failed to object to the government's evidence or to cross-examine witnesses.
See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir.) (refusing to
reverse a conviction where counsel failed to file a motion at trial), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 847 (1958); Illinois v. Washington, 241 N.E.2d 425, 428-29 (Ill. 1968)
(same); see also United States v. Clayborne, 509 F.2d 473, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(presuming that an attorney's failure to cross-examine was a tactical decision
which forecloses review); United States v. Katz, 425 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1970)
(holding that a counsel's sleeping at trial was not grounds for reversal). In-
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Prophylactic rules aid some clients who have no need of aid, at
some cost to law enforcement.84 If the system protects each cli-
ent whose lawyer makes an incorrect decision, there is no need
for defense lawyers to decide.85 Our heritage is to encourage
and rely on lawyers to vindicate clients' rights. The pre-reform
grand jury system allows competent lawyers to do so, without
prophylactic judicial intervention.
These conclusions bring us to the substantive content of
the proposed reforms. Disclaimers aside,s6 the proposals, in ef-
deed, counsel, rather than the defendant, may control the issues to be argued
on appeal. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983) (upholding a coun-
sel's choice of issues over defendant's objection).
These examples reflect decisions not to reverse convictions, rather than
the rejection of prophylactic rules to prevent errors before they occur. There
is no question that trial judges have the power to protect defendants before
trial, for example by disqualifying defense counsel in order to avoid any poten-
tial future effects of a conflict of interest. The existence of such discretionary
authority, however, should not be viewed as support for a self-initiating pro-
phylactic rule. Ordinarily, unless a defendant identifies and raises a potential
problem (e.g., a conflict), courts consider the defendant bound by counsel's
failure to protect his interests. See United States ex rel Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446
U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980) (stating that a court normally does not need to initiate
an inquiry into the propriety of an attorney's representation of multiple cli-
ents); cf FED. R. CRuM. P. 44(c) (requiring a court to inquire into the multiple
representation of federal defendants).
84. See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973) (noting that prophylactic
rules, by their nature, "will occasion windfall benefits for some defendants
who have suffered no constitutional deprivation"). Perhaps the clearest exam-
ple of the negative judicial attitude towards prophylactic rules is the absence
of a requirement that police provide counsel for all defendants subject to in-
terrogation. Such a rule is the logical solution to the problem identified in Mi-
randa v. Arizona; that is, the inherently coercive atmosphere surrounding
stationhouse interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-458 (1966).
Yet courts have resisted imposing an across-the-board requirement both for
cost reasons and the desire to avoid interfering with law enforcement when
the underlying concern (i.e., coercion) is absent. Id at 474.
85. Cf. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533-536 (1986) (holding a client
bound by the lawyer's tactical decision); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-
497 (1986) (same).
86. Proponents have always justified reform on the basis that a peculiar
reason to protect the attorney-client relationship exists in the grand jury sub-
poena context. See, e.g., Stern & Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1827-29 (discussing
the unique aspects of grand jury subpoenas); Foster, supra note 14, at 756-78
(discussing the effect of grand jury secrecy on the attorney-client relation-
ship). They have avoided resting their recommendations on any need to
change the scope of the attorney-client privilege or the "crime-fraud" excep-
tion. See, e.g., Peirce & Colamarino, supra note 13, at 860-63 (discussing the
impact on the attorney-client relationship and accepting the current state of
the law regarding the attorney-client privilege); Weiner, supra note 5, at 123-
24 (proposing administrative guidelines, but accepting status quo in the law of
attorney-client privilege).
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fect, expand the attorney-client privilege and support that ex-
pansion by weakening the grand jury's powers. Prosecutors
must do more than show that an attorney subpoena seeks un-
privileged or "crime-fraud" knowledge. The judicial review re-
quirements apply to all information "about a client"87 or
"obtained as a result of the attorney-client relationship,"8 8 cate-
gories that extend well beyond the privilege.8 9 Moreover, to
overcome the presumption of non-subpoenability, the prosecu-
tor must establish not only an exception to privilege, but also
must prove that the information is "essential" and that "there
is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information."' 9
Neither of these substantive elements come from the eviden-
tiary law defining privilege and its exceptions. When one con-
trasts the proposed standards with cases in which courts have
declined even to evaluate whether subpoenaed information is
"relevant,"9 1 one sees how far-reaching the new limitations are.
In part, proponents justify the heightened substantive re-
quirements as a mechanism to counteract prosecutorial abuse.
Because abusive attorney subpoenas can adversely affect attor-
ney-client relationships, proponents conclude that the subpoe-
nas should be available only as a last resort.92
Unfortunately, that conclusion assumes the answer to the
key issue: whether prosecutors routinely subpoena lawyers
87. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.8(f) (1983) (added
1990).
88. 1988 ABA Resolution, supra note 1, at 1853.
89. The privilege applies only to communications between attorney and
client, and only when those communications are made for the purpose of ob-
taining or giving legal advice. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2292, at 554. Indeed,
the category of information encompassed by the reform proposals may exceed
even the category considered confidential under the professional codes. The
codes require not only an underlying "attorney-client relationship," but also
that the information "relate to" or be "gained in" the relationship. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.6(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSEaUTY DR 4-101(A) (1981).
90. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rules 3.8(f)(ii)-(iii)
(1983) (added 1990). The 1986 ABA Resolution, supra note 1, omitted the re-
quirement that the subpoenaed testimony be "essential," substituting a rele-
vance threshold. Id. at 1852.
91. See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281-83 (1919) (holding
that a witness may not raise challenges related to the subject matter of a
grand jury investigation); cf In re Schofield, 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973) (es-
tablishing the requirement that prosecutors make a preliminary showing of
relevance in order to obtain handwriting samples, photographs, and finger-
prints), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).
92. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 14, at 752.
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rather than other available sources of information.93 In theory,
the professional codes already require prosecutors to act in
good faith. They forbid conduct intended merely to harass94
and charge prosecutors with a special ethical duty to "do jus-
tice. '95 Federal guidelines governing attorney subpoenas also
impose practical impediments to their issuance.9 Perhaps most
importantly, prosecutors' natural incentives favor the avoidance
of attorney subpoenas. Prosecutors know that lawyers, unlike
other grand jury witnesses, are likely to resist subpoenas and
that judges will view attorney subpoenas with distaste.9 More-
over, because attorney witnesses are aligned with their client's
interests, the attorneys will try to testify unfavorably and will
use any information they can glean from the grand jury pro-
ceedings to prepare the defense. Absent empirical evidence to
the contrary, one therefore would expect prosecutors to prefer
alternative witnesses. The reformers' unsupported assertions
of prosecutorial abuse, alone, cannot support a restrictive rule.
The most plausible explanation for the proposed substan-
tive limits on attorney subpoenas is the fear that lawyer-wit-
nesses will be intimidated when appearing before grand jurors
and, as a result, will make errors of judgment in deciding
whether particular questions threaten clients' rights. Logically,
however, this rationale at most justifies a substantive standard
93. In its report accompanying its proposed Rule 3.8, the ABA relied upon
statistics reflecting the number of attorney subpoenas prosecutors have issued
in recent years. 1990 ABA Report, supra note 33, at 5. These statistics do not
resolve the issue. First, the ABA's statistics include all attorney subpoenas,
not simply those arising in the grand jury context. Attorney subpoenas after
indictment are subject to more judicial supervision than grand jury subpoenas
and, because public, threaten attorney-client relationships to a lesser extent.
Perhaps more important, the number of attorney subpoenas in the ABA re-
port-especially when adjusted to remove non-grand jury subpoenas-does not
seem particularly high in comparison to the number of federal investigations
and prosecutions that take place. By itself, the ABA's statistical evidence
hardly supports the proposition that prosecutorial abuse is rampant.
94. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(A)(1)
(1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 3.1 cmt. (1983).
95. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 3.8 cmt. (1983).
96. In addition to setting stringent substantive requirements, the guide-
lines make trial level prosecutors obtain approval for attorney subpoenas from
supervisors high in the hierarchy of the Justice Department. See DOJ Guide-
lines, supra note 28, § 9-2.161(a)(D), at 36.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 653-54 (1st Cir.) (dis-
cussing attorney subpoenas disapprovingly), vacated, 832 F.2d 664, 667 (1st Cir.
1987) (en banc) (upholding local attorney subpoena rule, but noting with refer-
ence to the panel decision that the rule is not perfect).
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asking whether the subpoena "calls for privileged information,"
the standard currently applicable to motions to quash subpoe-
nas. More fundamentally, the proposition that lawyers are un-
able to think strategically in the grand jury room stands several
assumptions of the criminal justice system on their head.
Rightly or wrongly, the legitimacy of grand juries rests on the
belief that grand jurors themselves will protect the rights of
witnesses and targets.98 Since we do not worry that lay wit-
nesses will be intimidated into waiving rights by mistake,9 it is
peculiar to emphasize the fear of lawyer-witnesses who are fa-
miliar with the courtroom setting. Indeed, a trial lawyer's es-
sential skills include making evidentiary assessments, such as
the applicability of the privilege. If we are willing to bind cli-
ents to their lawyers' snap judgments at trial,1°° certainly we
should be just as willing to do so for grand jury testimony, the
substance of which the lawyer has advance warning.
The image of lawyers erroneously waiving client rights
before the grand jury makes sense only in one respect. Unlike
other aspects of the representation, a defense lawyer's grand
jury testimony and objections occur in a setting from which the
client is excluded. As a result, the client cannot be completely
confident that the lawyer has acted protectively. The client
must rely on the lawyer's report of what transpired, rather
than on his own observations and evaluation. To the extent the
reform proposals bolster clients' continued faith in lawyers who
have acted competently, they support the attorney-client privi-
lege and the values it serves.
The flaw inherent in the judicial review remedy is, again,
98. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) ("Historically, this body
has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty, mali-
cious and oppressive persecution."); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 554-55
(1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In the secrecy of the investigations by grand
juries, the weak and helpless... have found, and will continue to find, secur-
ity against official oppression... and the malevolence of private persons who
would use the machinery of the law to bring ruin upon their personal
enemies.").
99. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 579581 (1976) (rejecting
the right of a grand jury witness to receive Miranda warnings and to have
counsel in grand jury room); cf In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 335 (1957) (re-
jecting the right to counsel in an analogous statutorily-authorized investigative
process).
100. See Oregon v. Applegate, 591 P.2d 371, 373 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (sum-
marizing the reasons for considering objections not made at trial as waived),
review denied, 287 Or. 301 (1979). Of course, most jurisdictions recognize a
category of trial errors which may be raised on appeal even absent an objec-
tion. See, ag., FED. R. CRim. P. 52(b) (setting out the "plain error" rule).
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obvious. Pre-issuance judicial review increases the difficulty of
enforcing subpoenas. However, once a court approves the sub-
poena itself-holding, in essence, that the information sought is
unprivileged, essential, and unique-the remedy does not as-
suage any of the client's concerns. The client still has no way
of knowing that his lawyer is keeping the trust to the extent
she legally can. Indeed, because the pre-issuance hearing re-
sults from a mandatory procedure, the client does not even
have the minimal evidence of loyalty and aggressiveness that
he might have felt if the lawyer had filed a motion to quash on
her own.
In short, the current reform proposals are not tailored to
the specific threat posed by attorney subpoenas. The approach
of simply making subpoenas more difficult weakens the grand
jury's traditional investigative power. The proposals change the
law of attorney-client privilege, expanding its scope and using
procedural terminology to negate the exceptions-all while de-
nying any intent to question the correctness of the substantive
law. Although the reforms help immunize lawyers from the in-
convenience of testifying and the possibility of having to with-
draw from a case, the reforms do not reinforce attorney-client
trust. They do not give clients and observers a reason to be-
lieve that their attorneys are looking after their interests when
the attorneys must work behind closed doors.
IV. REMEDYING CLIENT CONCERNS
Although the above analysis calls the current reform pro-
posals into question, it also illustrates that the proposals do
identify legitimate client concerns. Attorney subpoenas
threaten client trust and may cause future clients to delay in
retaining lawyers or giving necessary information to them. As
we have seen, these dangers stem largely from the fact that the
subpoenaed attorney testifies secretly. If a client were in a po-
sition to know how his attorney acted on the stand, he could
evaluate the attorney's loyalty and aggressiveness on his behalf
without capitulating to suspicion and speculation.
Suppose, for example, that a prosecutor and court follow
Model Rule 3.8(f), and the court orders the subpoenaed lawyer
to tell the grand jury about payments from the client. This in-
formation is probably unprivileged and relevant to whether the
grand jury should file an indictment seeking forfeiture of the
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fees under several modern statutes.'0 ' Discussions concerning
the services provided in exchange for the fees, however, are
privileged. Under the current grand jury scheme, the client has
no way of knowing that the lawyer will protect, or has pro-
tected, this information when on the stand. Disclosing the
grand jury testimony to the client would provide reassurance.
Of course, a client who sees his lawyer testify under sub-
poena may feel betrayed at the mere fact that the lawyer is tes-
tifying, giving information against him, or cooperating with a
law enforcement agency. Uninformed clients may persist in
the belief that a truly competent lawyer would have found a
way to avoid appearing. But the reform proposals do not ad-
dress these perceptions, at least not if the proposals are honest
in accepting the law of privilege. Clients are simply not enti-
tled to avoid the betrayal, if it is betrayal, that accompanies dis-
closure of unprivileged information in the course of litigation.
Without the added effect of secrecy, disclosure in the grand
jury context involves no greater damage to the attorney-client
relationship than disclosure of "confidential" but unprivileged
information in the course of civil discovery.10 2 Similarly, the
101. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 881-83 (1988) (forfeiture of proceeds from the sale of
illegal drugs); see also supra note 9 (citing authorities on the unprivileged na-
ture of fee agreements).
102. The ABA Committee which proposed Model Rule 3.8(f) attempted to
overcome this objection by offering the following syllogism: The codes recog-
nize a category of confidential but unprivileged information, but clients do not
"draw fine distinctions or follow the nuances of the privilege and its expecta-
tions." 1990 ABA Report, supra note 33, at 7. Hence, "there could be nothing
more destructive of th[e] expectation" of attorney loyalty than for clients to
learn that lawyers are disclosing information. I& at 7-8. Moreover, because
the number of attorney subpoenas has increased in recent years, the procedure
now poses "one of the single greatest threats to the defense bar and to defend-
ants' ability to obtain criminal representation." IE at 5 (quoting ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK, REPORT ON THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOE-
NAS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY STATE AND FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 1 (July 1985)).
The fallacy of this logic is that the cause of the loss of client faith is not
the subpoena itself, but rather the defense lawyer's failure to explain what in-
formation is truly immune from disclosure. See supra note 16. The attempt to
bolster the argument by reference to the increasing number of subpoenas is a
rhetorical trick. The number remains small when compared to the total
number of criminal prosecutions. Clients' chances of losing their attorneys
through withdrawal or disqualification are far smaller in the criminal than the
civil context, where tactical motions to disqualify counsel have become rou-
tine. See, e.g., J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Gurfein, J., concurring) (discussing tactical motions to disqualify in civil
cases); Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (same). For an
analysis of prosecutorial motions to disqualify, see Zacharias, supra note 26, at
71-74.
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possibility that the client's chosen counsel might be disqualified
or forced to withdraw because of grand jury testimony does not
justify reform, as long as the conflict legally and ethically re-
quires disqualification and stems from information the client
has no right to keep secret.10 3
This brings us to the question: how would enabling clients
to be present at or to receive a transcript of their attorney's
grand jury testimony mesh with law enforcement interests and
traditional grand jury secrecy? Secrecy rules vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction,1' 4 with Rule 6(e)(2) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure providing the model starting point. Rule
(6) (e) (2) provides, in pertinent part:
A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a record-
ing device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney
for the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under
paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters oc-
curring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in
these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person
except in accordance with this rule.10 5
Disclosure of a witness's testimony is also permitted upon court
ordera°6 and is routinely required after a witness's testimony
against a defendant at trial. 0 7
Strikingly exempt from the secrecy requirements is the
grand jury witness. Whatever the government's interests in si-
lence may be, they do not entitle the government to secrecy
when the witness herself discloses.'08 Since a lawyer-witness
103. Cf. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 628-31
(1989) (establishing that the government has an interest in recovering forfeita-
ble assets overriding the Sixth Amendment interest in permitting criminals to
use assets to retain defense counsel of their choice); Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153, 159-160 (1988) (stating that the Sixth Amendment right to choose
counsel is circumscribed in many respects); see also supra note 22 (quoting
Wheat).
104. See KAmsAR ET AL., supra note 78, at 639-40. See generally LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supra note 70, § 8.5 (discussing the secrecy requirements and their
origins).
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (emphasis added).
106. FED. R. CnM . P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i), (ii), (iv).
107. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988) (requiring the disclosure of prior
statements by government witnesses who have "testified on direct examina-
tion"). American jurisdictions are divided on the issue of whether defendants
are entitled to pretrial disclosure of pretrial statements by witnesses the gov-
ernment intends to call. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 78, at 1146-47
(describing the split in state rules).
108. Cf Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 n.3 (1990) (noting that
federal law and most state laws exempt grand jury witnesses from secrecy re-
quirements, but not addressing the issue of whether statutes could require wit-
nesses to maintain secrecy during the pendency of grand jury investigations).
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who continues to represent the client owes the client a profes-
sional duty to keep him informed,1° 9 it follows that the govern-
ment may not insist that the lawyer keep the client in the dark.
A rule requiring client access to the lawyer's grand jury
testimony therefore would not circumscribe any governmental
interest in secrecy or law enforcement that society currently
recognizes. n The real question facing reformers is where the
lawyer's responsibilities lie. In other words, if the lawyer with-
draws and thereby terminates her obligation to keep the client
informed, does the lawyer retain a personal right to keep her
grand jury testimony secret?"'
One key to answering this question concerns when the
withdrawal takes place. If the attorney does not withdraw un-
til after her testimony is complete, then clearly her primary ob-
ligations are to her client." 2 A rule mandating disclosure is
109. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983) (requir-
ing lawyers to keep clients reasonably informed about the status of the matter
and to explain a matter to the extent necessary to permit the client to make
"informed decisions regarding the representation"); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981) (providing that a lawyer should make
best efforts "to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client
has been informed of relevant considerations"); id EC 9-2 (providing that "a
lawyer should fully and promptly inform his client of material
developments").
110. Special circumstances implicating such interests may arise. In some
situations, letting a client observe the proceedings or learn the identity of the
grand jurors might threaten the jurors. However, safeguards to accommodate
the jurors' fears easily can be developed. In the circumstances described, one
could, for example, limit the client to reviewing an appropriately redacted
transcript or to witnessing the proceedings from behind a screen. For our pur-
poses, the essential point remains: The government has no general right to
keep the information from the client if the lawyer-witness wants, is willing, or
is required to disclose.
111. In United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), the
Court identified several interests witnesses may have in grand jury secrecy.
These include interests in avoiding retaliation or indictment by persons who
learn of the testimony and in avoiding the stain of investigation if the witness
is exonerated without indictment. Id at 681-82. Lawyer-witnesses share these
interests. Insofar as they are inconsistent with the lawyer's duty to keep cli-
ents informed, see supra note 109, the interests have diminished force.
112. If the lawyer has not withdrawn, her representation of the client must
be considered ongoing. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3
cmt. (1983). A lawyer's first obligation, whether based on fiduciary notions or
the codes, is to the interests of her client. See id Rule 1.7 cmt. (describing the
duty of loyalty and noting that a "lawyer's own interests should not be permit-
ted to have adverse effect on representation of a client"); see also MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIILITY EC 5-2 (1981) (stating that a lawyer's per-
sonal interest may not "affect adversely the advice to be given or services to be
rendered").
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consistent with the professional codes in requiring that the at-
torney's self-interest give way.113 Similarly, an attorney who
identifies a conflict in the midst of her testimony is obliged to
protect her client's interest. Her professional duty is to cease
testifying and petition the court for a continuance so that the
client may obtain conflict-free representation. The new attor-
ney may then, if appropriate, intervene to safeguard the
client.114
This difficult scenario arises when the attorney recognizes
the adverse impact upon her judgment as soon as she receives
the subpoena. Suppose the attorney, upon realizing that she
has unprivileged information (e.g., regarding the client's ongo-
ing crimes) or that she herself is implicated in a crime, with-
draws from the representation before testifying. Suppose
further that she has a reason to want to keep the testimony se-
cret from the client-for example, because she fears retaliation
if the client learns the substance of her testimony. We know
that protecting witnesses is a significant goal of grand jury se-
crecy.115 Would eliminating secrecy in this scenario unduly in-
terfere with the lawyer's rights or the grand jury's investigative
function? Conversely, would the purpose of attorney subpoena
reform be disserved if secrecy were maintained and the client
relegated to pre-reform remedies?
The hypothetical attorney has some interest in secrecy. It
is important to recognize, however, just how limited that inter-
est is. The attorney has no justification for keeping the fact of
her testimony secret, for she is obligated to enable the client to
intervene and assert the attorney-client privilege. Similarly,
she is not entitled to keep the subject matter secret, because in
the course of the motion to quash proceedings, the litigants and
court must be told enough about the subject matter to decide if
the privilege attaches. 116 The attorney's potential interest in
113. Cf CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6068 (e), (h) (West 1990 & Supp. 1992)
(requiring lawyers to maintain client confidentiality "at every peril to him-
self" and to avoid rejecting representation of the defenseless "for any consid-
eration personal to himself").
114. See supra notes 49, 55 (discussing the procedures by which a lawyer-
witness may preserve her client's privilege argument and citing authorities).
115. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1380 (1990); United States v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958); cf KAMISAR Fr AL., supra
note 78, at 639 n.b ("During the pendency of the investigation, every effort is
made to assist the witness who wants to keep his testimony secret.").
116. Some reform proposals, like those urged by the 1986 ABA Resolution,
supra note 1, would require only an ex parte showing by the prosecutor. A
prosecutor could thus attempt to keep the subject matter of the expected testi-
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maintaining secrecy is therefore confined to the actual sub-
stance of the testimony-what she does and does not say.
These considerations significantly narrow the range of
cases that present legitimate lawyer interests against releasing
testimony to clients. Consider what the facts will look like in
our hypothetical scenario and what is still subject to secrecy if
the lawyer has acted properly. Following a motion to quash,
the client has a new lawyer and knows the following: (1) the
client's original lawyer has withdrawn because of a conflict of
interest or because she may have to appear as a witness at trial
against the client, (2) the lawyer will testify in the grand jury
under subpoena, (3) the testimony will concern matters de-
scribed in the hearing on the motion to quash (e.g., fees the
lawyer received or ongoing crimes the client discussed with the
lawyer), and (4) the court has determined that those matters
are unprivileged or subject to an exception. With this much in-
formation revealed, one must wonder what sense of loyalty
breaching secrecy further would preserve, on the one hand, and
how important the remaining secrecy is to the lawyer, on the
other. In order to select appropriate reform, one must decide
how to balance these limited competing interests.
The client has no right to control the grand jury testimony
or to have the lawyer-witness lie on his behalf. Nevertheless,
the client retains some "loyalty interests" in knowing the sub-
stance of the testimony. The client is entitled to feel secure
that the lawyer-witness will not falsely accuse him and to feel
secure that the lawyer-witness will assert the privilege where
appropriate. Future clients' willingness to rely on lawyers may
be affected if it becomes known that current clients doubt they
are being treated fairly.
The lawyer, in contrast, has virtually nothing to gain by
continued secrecy. The client already knows that the lawyer
will testify, and on what subject. The client knows what truth-
ful information the lawyer has." 7 Since the lawyer has no
mony secret. However, a good lawyer ordinarily would feel obligated to move
to quash-or enable the defendant to so move-if potentially privileged infor-
mation is at issue. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. A more adver-
sarial procedure therefore would still occur, and the nature of the subject
matter would be revealed.
117. The existence of such knowledge is a factor courts rely upon in decid-
ing whether to reveal grand jury information to third parties pursuant to Rule
6(e)(5) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although judges are re-
luctant to reveal information while the grand jury's investigation proceeds,
they are more likely to do so when the party seeking the information can
show a direct need for it and is already familiar with the subject matter. See
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right to testify falsely, both she and the client know how she
should testify. The only possibly legitimate way that keeping
the substance of the testimony secret can help the lawyer (e.g.,
to avoid retaliation) is by enabling the lawyer to testify truth-
fully while telling the client she has done the opposite. 18
Preserving the lawyer's ability to mislead the former client
is not a sufficient reason to maintain grand jury secrecy in the
attorney subpoena context. In so acting, the lawyer would con-
fuse and damage the client's current defense. Although a for-
mer client has neither the right to continued representation
nor a valid expectation that the lawyer will disobey the legal
subpoena, the professional rules recognize some continuing ob-
ligations on the lawyer's part.119 Even after withdrawal, the
lawyer must protect a client's interests, 20 regardless of the cost
to herself.2 1
The conclusion thus seems inescapable that reform propos-
als would be justified--or at least consistent with the current
conception of lawyers' professional responsibilities-in treating
a lawyer-witness's interest in grand jury secrecy as subordinate
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 217-224 (1979) (balanc-
ing the government's and witnesses' interests in secrecy against a third party's
need for the information).
118. In theory, a middle ground exists. The lawyer-witness might be able
to avoid telling the client what she said without lying to the client. In practice,
however, this option seems meaningless. A lawyer who is afraid of her client's
actions simply will not dare to tell the client, "I testified, but I will not tell you
what I said." More to the point, whether she plans to lie or simply stay silent,
the lawyer has a professional obligation to safeguard her former client's inter-
ests. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 (1983) (detailing
a lawyer's responsibilities with regard to conflicts of interest involving former
clients); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1981)
(instructing attorneys to decline proferred employment if it would involve her
in "differing interests").
119. The rules governing successive representation of clients provide a di-
rect analogy. They forbid lawyers from representing subsequent clients with
interests adverse to former clients in the same or a substantially similar mat-
ter. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(A) (1983); cf. MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A) (1981) (requiring that
lawyers avoid representing "differing interests"). Similarly, a lawyer may not
use any information "relating to the [former] representation" to the disadvan-
tage of the former client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.9(c)(1) (1983). These provisions reflect the common law rule that a lawyer's
fiduciary obligations extend beyond the termination of the representation. CQ.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 cmt. (1957) (requiring that an agent,
when the agency relationship terminates without the principal's fault, give the
principal relevant information).
120. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (1983).
121. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (requiring a lawyer to
maintain confidentiality "at every peril to himself").
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to client interests. If that is the case, no separate law enforce-
ment considerations stand in the way of reforms that would
either open the grand jury room to clients while their lawyers
testify or entitle clients to transcripts. Such reforms would di-
rectly serve the right of clients to assure that lawyers remain
suitably loyal and assert all of the clients' legally enforceable
interests. 22
V. THE IMPACT OF CHANGING REFORM PROPOSALS
TO FOCUS ON SECRECY
We can gain insight into the current reform proposals by
comparing their potential impact with the potential impact of
releasing lawyers' grand jury testimony to clients. Who bene-
fits and loses from the change in focus, and how?
Clients would get both more and less from rules formu-
lated on the alternative "secrecy" approach. They receive
heightened protection for their right to be sure that lawyers are
as loyal as the law allows. Their specific remedy for
prosecutorial misconduct remains essentially unchanged.m In
a practical sense, however, clients lose in their reduced ability
to avoid legitimate attorney subpoenas. The secrecy approach
discussed here would not include prophylactic hearing rules or
impose on the government a requirement to show a need unre-
lated to client privilege. Nor, in the absence of improper
prosecutorial motivation, would it require prosecutors to seek
122. In all aspects of the legal system, clients have varying abilities to use
or benefit from rights they are accorded. In some instances, clients need legal
assistance simply to understand the significance of what has transpired. Here,
some clients may have more difficulty than others in understanding the grand
jury testimony and its implications for attorney loyalty. Nevertheless, the tes-
timony provides a starting point for explanatory discussions between lawyer
and client. It serves to eliminate the client's suppositions and suspicions re-
garding what occurred behind closed doors. That alone often will obviate any
need for independent legal advice.
123. Although some proposals shift the burden of proof to prosecutors, the
proposals still require clients to establish misuse of the grand jury mechanism
to avoid the attorney subpoena. See, e.g., 1988 ABA Resolution, supra note 1, at
1853 (requiring that a prosecutor establish, and a court find, that the subpoena
does not have "the purpose... to harass the attorney or his or her client"). A
prosecutor has the wherewithal to show the need for a subpoena, but rarely
will be able to prove the absence of a purpose to harass. At best, he can sub-
mit an affidavit or statement disclaiming such a purpose. In practice, there-
fore, courts are likely to assume the absence of improper purpose even where
reforms shift the burden, unless the defendant can make out a prima facie
case of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendants are entitled to do this under pre-
reform law as well. See supra note 78.
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information elsewhere so long as the lawyer-witness presents a
legal source. Still, clients have no claim of entitlement to a
rule giving them these advantages. A secrecy approach fully
protects their rights.
Initially, prosecutors might react negatively to a reform
proposal that incorporates an exception to grand jury se-
crecy.'-4 Upon close examination, however, the net effect of
the change in focus facilitates law enforcement. Compared to
the current proposals, the secrecy approach would limit the
grand jury's ability to investigate and subpoena witnesses only
to a limited extent. A rule requiring that a lawyer's grand jury
testimony be revealed to clients would never prevent the grand
jury from obtaining relevant, unprivileged testimony.
Although in theory witnesses are more forthcoming in an at-
mosphere of secrecy, lawyer-witnesses in most cases will be in-
clined and have a professional obligation to disclose the
testimony to clients informally.125 Confirming the testimony
(e.g., by permitting clients to observe it or review a transcript)
will have minimal additional, impact on legitimate law enforce-
ment interests.1 2 6
Insofar as the secrecy approach clarifies prosecutors' own
role with respect to attorney subpoenas, it benefits prosecutors
personally. Both the current proposals and this Article have
focused on how the clients' legal rights should affect the grand
jury's power to seek attorney subpoenas. Neither has touched
upon the separate issue of whether and when prosecutors
should, as a matter of professional ethics, use their discretion to
exercise, or encourage the grand jury to exercise, that power.
The ethical issue is complicated by the prosecutor's duty to "do
justice,"1 2 7 and thus perhaps to take into account a target's non-
124. Of course, grand jury secrecy is not sacrosanct. Exceptions already ex-
ist, including court-ordered disclosures, disclosures when grand jury witnesses
become witnesses at trial, and the general exception allowing witnesses to re-
veal what they wish. The exception proposed here is arguably similar in kind
to the existing exceptions. It applies in limited circumstances and, in scope,
allows only revelation of information that a witness would be likely to disclose
voluntarily.
125. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
126. Having a transcript might help the defendant's trial lawyer in prepar-
ing and executing a cross-examination of the witness to that extent the
chances of conviction may be lessened. However, the existence of the Jencks
Act (and similar state statutes) suggests that avoiding full cross-examination
of trial witnesses is not a valid law enforcement goal. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500(e)(3) (1988) (requiring disclosure of trial witness's grand jury
statements).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.8 cmt. (1983) (re-
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enforceable interests in maintaining a good attorney-client rela-
tionship and in keeping the counsel of his choice.12s
A secrecy rule that highlights the elements of the attorney-
client relationship rather than creating general limits on sub-
poenas may help shape prosecutors' ethical thinking. Instead of
focusing on ways to overcome an artificial hurdle to law en-
forcement, prosecutors may start to consider the decision of
whether to subpoena an attorney in the rule's terms; that is,
how the subpoena will affect the attorney-client relationship.
That, in and of itself, would help prosecutors define their role
as participants in maintaining a fair adversarial process, in
which they may act aggressively so long as the defendant and
his counsel can do the same.129 One would hope that prosecu-
tors would take seriously their obligations to maintain a level
adversarial playing field by abjuring marginal subpoenas that
significantly impact defendants' use and choice of counsel. At a
minimum, a rule that hones in on the element of loyalty
should, by emphasizing the importance of the trust relation-
ship, encourage prosecutorial self-restraint in the issuance of
attorney subpoenas.
This brief analysis of the impact of the alternative secrecy
quiring government lawyer to act as a "minister of justice"); MODEL CODE OF
PROFmSSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY EC 7-13 (1981) (requiring government lawyers
to "seek justice").
128. The precise meaning of the prosecutorial duty to do "justice" is un-
clear. See Zacharias, supra note 26, at 46-47 & nn.2, 6 (noting and citing au-
thorities for the proposition that the codes, judicial decisions, and interpretive
literature are unclear, and proposing an interpretation of what the codes
would consider "justice" at trial); see also George T. Frampton, Jr., Some Prac-
tical and Ethical Problems of Prosecuting Public Officials, 36 MD. L. REv. 5, 7
(1976) (discussing the role of the prosecutor in administering the criminal jus-
tice system); H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethi-
cal Standard. Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1168 (1973)
(discussing the nature of the prosecutorial obligation to do justice). The con-
cept of prosecutorial justice undoubtedly encompasses some objective consider-
ation of the defendant's interest in receiving a fair trial. See Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (discussing prosecutors' obligations to defend-
ants); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and
Trial Judges, 50 TEx. L. REV. 629, 632 (1972) (discussing prosecutors' duty to
restrain selves to preserve fair trial); J. Allison DeFoor II, Prosecutorial Mis-
conduct in Closing Argument, 7 NOVA L. REV. 443, 448 (1983) (noting prosecu-
tor's duty to mitigate guilt under Florida law). Arguably, prosecutors have a
general obligation to ensure the proper operation of the adversary system and
therefore must help maintain a contest in which a defendant can employ the
services of a lawyer he trusts. See generally Zacharias, supra note 26, at 60-65
(defining the prosecutor's obligation in terms of the adversarial process).
129. See Zacharias, supra note 26, at 65-74 (discussing the prosecutor's obli-
gation to preserve defense counsel's effectiveness).
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approach on the players and the system illustrates that the only
real loser is the bar. Compared to the current proposals, the se-
crecy approach would require lawyers to testify more fre-
quently, bear full responsibility for protecting and asserting
clients' interests in preventing testimony,130 and lose clients
(through withdrawal or disqualification) earlier and more
often. The secrecy approach also places a premium on lawyer
judgment and skill-in initially advising clients about the scope
of confidentiality and privilege, in determining when the privi-
lege should be asserted, and in deciding when it behooves them
to withdraw.
With the responsibility to carry out these functions, law-
yers would become burdened with the possibility of legal liabil-
ity for failure to act competently. Those whose carelessness in
soliciting unprivileged information causes the client discomfort
no longer could hide the consequences of their conduct from
the client.131 Moreover, unlike under the current proposals,
lawyers whose own acts are under investigation could not use
the general existence of client rights as a shield. In relative
terms, reforms that focus on secrecy clearly would inconven-
ience the bar.132
CONCLUSION
When one analyzes the current reform proposals and rec-
ognizes their obvious flaws, one comes away with the nagging
sense that proponents have a hidden agenda.133 At least for ob-
130. Lawyers could not, in other words, rely on a prophylactic hearing rule
to substitute for their own initiative. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
131. What this means for the attorney in the hypothetical scenario dis-
cussed above is that she accepts the client at her own peril. If she agrees to
represent someone whom she fears, or will fear if she disobeys, she must live
with the risks inherent in fulfilling her professional and legal obligations.
132. Indeed, the degree to which the current proposals benefit lawyers'
personal interests raises serious questions about the proponents' good faith.
But identifying the true reasons for the proposals is beyond this Article's
scope. See Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59
TEX. L. REV. 639, 655-56 (1981) (questioning the motives underlying profes-
sional rules); Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 326
(1986) (suggesting that anti-solicitation rules serve primarily the bar); Deborah
L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 TEx. L. REV. 689, 691-92 (1981) (discussing the bar's self-interest in
promulgating rules); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality 11k Is Con-
fuentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REv. 601, 629-30 & nn.138-39, 144-45
(1990) (identifying various potentially self-serving professional rules and citing
authorities).
133. Cf. Koniak, supra note 1 (discussing generally the conflict between
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servers of the criminal justice system who have a defense orien-
tation, prosecutorial authority to issue attorney subpoenas
seems unfair. It gives prosecutors an edge over the defense, an
ability to obtain unilateral discovery and exercise one-sided in-
fluence over who will present the opposing case. Unfettered
subpoena power is a symbol of the grand jury investigative dis-
cretion that many consider inherently abusive of individual
rights. From the personal perspective of some members of the
defense bar, attorney subpoenas may also have significant eco-
nomic effects.L3 4 The proposed attorney subpoena reforms ar-
guably could play a part in remedying these "systemic" flaws.
Perhaps bedause these problems are not universally per-
ceived-or perhaps because they lack support for changing the
system on these grounds-proponents of reforms have relied
upon other justifications. Having done so, they must be pre-
pared to defend the reforms on the basis of those justifications.
The above analysis suggests that they cannot. The proposed re-
medial schemes simply do not correspond to the aspects of at-
torney-client relationships that the proposals purport to
address. A remedy focusing on grand jury secrecy would serve
the values threatened by attorney subpoenas far better. Legiti-
mate client interests would be protected. Law enforcement
would not be unduly hampered.
To the extent the current reform proposals stem from a
genuine concern over lawyer-client trust rather than a hidden
agenda, they reflect, in a microcosm, the ongoing debate over
the use of prophylactic rules to protect defendants' rights. 3 5
The proposed reforms work, if at all, by making the investiga-
tive task more difficult--catching some appropriate and some
inappropriate subpoenas in the process. Even accepting the
merits of prophylactic rules in principle, most observers would
state-enacted law and the bar's view of what the law should be); Cramton &
Udell, supra note 1, at 126-63 (discussing Model Rule 3.8(f) and concluding
that by "provid[ing] special procedures for lawyers ... the profession seeks to
put itself above the law").
134. The ABA's emphasis on the potential effect of attorney subpoenas on
defense lawyers' willingness to continue representing clients indirectly sug-
gests that economic effects are, in fact, on the minds of reform proponents.
See 1990 ABA Report, supra note 33, at 8 (discussing the ability of criminal de-
fendants to obtain representation).
135. Compare Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L.
REv. 435, 460 (1987) (arguing that Miranda reaffirms our constitutional com-
mitment at minimal cost to law enforcement) with Grano I, supra note 82, at
176 (arguing that Schulhofer neither understands nor responds to legitimacy
argument); Grano II, supra note 82, at 129 (questioning the legitimacy of pro-
phylactic rules).
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agree that they should not be employed until and unless more
directed remedies prove unworkable.'L6 The essential flaw of
reform proposals like the ABA's is their failure to consider
whether other remedies for correcting the evils of attorney sub-
poenas exist.
The secrecy approach suggested in this Article would place
the primary responsibility for creating and preserving a mean-
ingful attorney-client relationship on lawyers who are honest
with their clients and competent on their behalf. Since the pro-
fession has already drawn the correlation between effectiveness
and client trust, that is as it should be.137 In the context of at-
torney subpoenas, lawyers can ordinarily avoid any threat to
clients' sense of loyalty by preparing clients for the risks that
disclosure of unprivileged information entails.lss Nevertheless,
a few circumstances are beyond the lawyer's control, including
the justifiable suspicions that clients may feel concerning law-
yer testimony behind closed doors. The secrecy-approach seeks
to fill that specific gap, to assure clients their due when the cli-
ents' chosen representatives cannot do so themselves.
136. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961) (adopting the prophy-
lactic exclusionary rule on the basis that "other remedies have been worthless
and futile").
137. See Zacharias, supra note 7, at 358 & nn.28-31 (explaining and ques-
tioning instrumental justifications for attorney-client confidentiality and citing
authorities).
138. A full analysis of what lawyers should tell clients about confidential-
ity is beyond the scope of this Article. As a general matter, the issue is com-
plex. An explanation of confidentiality that is too cursory may trap the client.
An overly-detailed explanation also can be counterproductive.
Nevertheless, criminal defense attorneys, in particular, should be able to
develop an appropriately balanced warning. The presence of limits on crimi-
nal discovery and the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege mean that
there are only a few matters that defense attorneys realistically may be forced
to disclose. In cases involving these matters, good representation probably
must include educating clients regarding confidentiality's limits. See supra
note 52 and authorities cited therein.
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